in Europe, our liberty will be swamped by excessive Executive authority, and we will see here a completely totalitarian government.'4 Ill-founded though such notions were, they remained central to Taft's constitutional thinking.
Taft approached foreign affairs with suspicion and misgiving, recognizing that an active foreign policy was likely to emphasize the role of the President at the expense of Congress. His isolationism in the pre-war period can be partly explained in these terms: war, and preparation for war, would inevitably strengthen the Executive power and increase Federal regulation of American economic and political life -the very opposite of his own domestic policy, which stressed a strong Congress and limited government. 5 The great difficulty in Taft's emphasis upon the domestic issue of liberty was that he failed to relate it effectively to those foreign policy issues of national security upon which domestic liberty itself depends. But since Taft believed in the invulnerability of the United States (at least until the last few years of his life), he assumed that he was correct in his constitutional thinking to maximize the importance of domestic factors whilst minimizing the significance of foreign policy issues. In the midst of American participation in the Second World War, Taft was still arguing that the real issues facing American citizens were domestic.6 Since Taft judged foreign policy from the standpoint of its domestic consequences, how was this view expressed in constitutional terms?
Taft gave a public exposition of his constitutional ideas at the outset of his career as a United States Senator in a series of debates with a well-known New Deal intellectual, Professor Thomas Vernor Smith, broadcast by the Columbia Broadcasting System between February and May 1939. 7 When debating the respective powers of the Congress and the Presidency in foreign affairs, Taft asserted that the President's powers were 'quite limited'. He was at pains to emphasize the restraints placed on the express powers granted to the President under the articles of the Constitution, especially the need for the concurrence of the Senate in treaty-making. Taft conceded, however, that: 'from the nature of foreign relations, and from the beginning of the Government, the courts and the Congftss have held that the President's power over foreign relations is predominant. The nation cannot speak with a multitude of voices, and the President must be the person who conducts all negotiations with foreign nations.'8 But Taft then swiftly moved his argument back to a position of asserting Congressional authority: 'Congress, and particularly the Senate, is given extensive powers and duties with reference to any Government action other than negotiation in the foreign field.'9
When examining the constitutional limits placed on the war powers of the President, Taft displayed the cautious optimism which Congressional conservatives felt in the early months of 1939 in being able to hold the Executive in check. The Senator warned that 'the President should be exceptionally careful about promising support in war, which he cannot give without action of Congress, for Congress accurately reflects today the determination of the American people that they shall not become involved in European war' .10
On the general question of the restraints upon Executive power, the Senator declared: 'The President is responsible for what this nation says to foreign nations, but he must be very careful in his statements as to what this nation will or will not do, because unlike most executives in European countries, he has not the final power to put his foreign policy into effect."' Taft's greatest worry in 1939 was that war would result in the undermining of the Constitution and the eventual destruction of democracy in America. In the event of war he seriously believed that 'there would be an immediate demand for arbitrary power, unlimited control of wages, prices, and agriculture, and complete confiscation of private property. We would be bound to go far towards totalitarianism. It is doubtful whether we would ever return.'12 These greatly exaggerated views were those of a man who commanded the allegiance of a sizeable body of Republican voters and was shortly to be a serious contender for the Presidency of the United States. Taft's position sheds an interesting light upon the thinking of conservative isolationists as the war clouds gathered over Europe.
The constitutional views which Taft advocated in the debates with Professor Smith, although plainly unoriginal, were deeply and genuinely held. They were also popular. A Gallup Poll revealed that two-thirds of the listeners believed that Taft had won the argument.'3 The popular reaction to Taft's constitutional conservatism at this time serves as a useful reminder of the great difficulties which President Roosevelt faced in making foreign policy in the fateful year of 1939. In addressing himself to the place of the President and the Congress in foreign policy, Taft wrote: 'There can be no question that the executive departments have claimed more and more power over the field of foreign policy at the same time that the importance of foreign policy in its effect upon every feature of American life has steadily increased. If the present trend continues, it seems obvious to me that the President will become a complete dictator in the entire field of foreign policy and thereby acquire power to force upon Congress all kinds of domestic policies which must necessarily follow. '5 The principal points of Taft 
